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Introduction
The interpretative character of translation consists, at least in theory, of two distinct 
operations. To begin with, translation implies explanation. Because languages are 
incompatible – words do not express the same meanings, grammar is organised 
differently, stylistic norms vary – translation is necessarily mediated by an 
understanding of the meaning of the source text. With a view to recreating the 
tenor of the source text, the translator must try to identify its intended meaning 
(or meanings) and devise an equivalent in the target text that enables only 
that meaning (or those meanings). Choices need to be made. Some potential 
meanings will be given up. New ones may unwittingly be generated. Translation is 
the art of the feasible. An understanding of the source text and knowledge of the 
receptor language allows the construction of a sort of bridge, linking two worlds. 
The explanatory element in translation is often viewed as a factor denaturing the 
text. Because a translation is at the same time a commentary, it cannot be entirely 
faithful to the source. This view may have it right in practice. In principle, however, 
the explanatory element serves to preserve meaning. It is a type of damage control. 
The meaning of the original is indeed affected, but as little as possible.
Explanation, however, is not the only factor affecting the meaning of the source 
text. Even if perfect transferral of the meaning of the source were possible, the 
reiteration and restatement of a text would by itself alter its meaning. As Heraclitus 
said, it is impossible to enter the same river twice. The key concept here is not 
that of linguistic incompatibility but of differing pragmatic contexts. The source 
1 Shortened version of a paper read at the international conference on Translation–Interpretation–
Meaning, held at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies on January 27–29, 2005. I am grateful 
to the organizers, Anneli Aejmelaeus and Päivi Pahta, for creating an occasion for interdisciplinary 
study of the complex phenomenon of translation. I also thank them and the team of the Collegium for 
their wonderful hospitality. 
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text came into being in a given culture, addressing a given audience, responding 
to a given need. The translation introduces the text into a different culture and 
addresses another audience. The translation may well arise from an altogether 
different need. In this respect, translation is akin to quotation.2 Quotations 
reproduce earlier statements, often literally, but they usually imply a meaning that 
diverges somewhat from the meaning expressed originally. Similarly, by virtue of 
the differing communicative situation, the meaning of a translation will differ from 
that of the source text.
“Explanation” and “quotation” can, of course, occur in isolation. What defines 
the phenomenon of translation is that it combines them in an inextricable manner. 
A translation can never be the same, nor express the same meaning, as the source 
text. The problem is felt with particular sharpness in the area of Bible translation. 
How can one translate the word of God? If the Bible is true, will it still be true when 
its meaning is changed in translation? In what follows, I will try to illustrate the two 
sides – explanation and quotation – with reference to one particularly famous Bible 
translation. 
Explanation in the Septuagint
With regard to the Septuagint, the question of explanation or exegesis is itself a 
complex one. Scholars have sometimes been tempted to “cream off” a small number 
of theologically significant passages, and to view the entire exegetical method of 
the translators in their light. That temptation should be resisted, however, for fear 
of finding only those passages that accord with one’s preconceived notions. A 
comprehensive approach is called for, studying the translational process as much 
as possible in its entirety (Joosten 1998). In the present context, I would like to 
propose three basic categories. 
a) Spontaneous exegesis
Much of the work of the translators has a more or less spontaneous character. 
It didn’t take much thinking to translate ~r"b.a; %l,YEw:, “and Abram went,” in Genesis 
12:4, as kai. evporeu,qh VAbra,m. This is not to say that the procedure is a mechanical 
one. Even the most faithful and literal renderings involve choices for the translator. 
Thus in the same verse, jAl ATai %l,YEw:, “and Lot went with him,” is rendered kai. 
w;|ceto metV auvtou/ Lw,t, using a different verb of similar meaning. Languages are 
subtle instruments. The interplay of lexicon, grammar, and context leads to endless 
2 The idea that translation is a type of quotation I heard for the first time from my friend, Steve 
Daley. Andrew Chesterman informed me that Ernst-August Gutt has elaborated a whole theory of 
translation from the notion of quotation (Gutt 1991).
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possibilities that cannot be codified in any simple way. The Hebrew word varo ‘head’ 
could in most cases be translated with Greek kefalh,; but the ‘head’ of a mountain 
required a different word, korufh, or a;kroj, ‘top.’ Very probably, the Septuagint 
translators were rendering the Hebrew into their native language. Most of the 
choices they faced posed no problem. The selection of the required equivalent 
would be made intuitively and spontaneously. 
Even when a word was unknown to the translators, the basic approach remains 
similar. In Proverbs 3:8, it is recommended to fear the Lord and turn away from evil, 
for, it is said:
^R<v'l. yhiT. tWap.rI “it will be a healing for your flesh 
^yt,Amc.[;l. yWQviw> and a refreshment (?) for your bones”
. (after the NRSV)
The rare word yWQvi, probably meaning ‘drink’ or ‘moisture,’ seems to have been 
unknown to the Greek translator who renders as follows:
to,te i;asij e;stai tw/| sw,mati, sou “then there will be healing for your body
kai. evpime,leia toi/j ovste,oij sou and care for your bones”
The difficult word appears to be rendered here after the context. Although such 
instances require some reflection on the part of the translator, the path from the 
Hebrew to the Greek remains straightforward. 
Another special case is that of idiomatic expressions. In rendering these 
expressions, the translator often had a basic choice between translating the 
individual words, and thus mystifying at least part of his audience, or translating 
the global, “exocentric” meaning (Babut 1995), sacrificing an adherence to the 
precise wording of the source text. Both approaches are found in the Septuagint. 
For instance, Hebrew “to fill someone’s hand” meaning “to ordain someone to a 
religious office” is rendered literally in some passages and freely in others:
Exodus 28:43(41)
~d"y"-ta, t'aLemiW “you shall ordain them” (lit. ‘fill their hands’) 
evmplh,seij auvtw/n ta.j cei/raj “you shall fill their hands”
Leviticus 21:10
Ady"-ta, aLemi “(who) has been ordained (lit. ‘[whose] hand
one has filled’)”
teteleiwme,nou “having been consecrated”
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It should be noted, however, that the translators of the Pentateuch most often 
reject this basic choice, eating their cake and having it too, so to speak. In Exodus 
29:33,35; Leviticus 8:33; 16:32; Numbers 3:3 the expression “to fill someone’s 
hand” is rendered teleio,w ta.j cei/raj ti,noj “to consecrate someone’s hands”!
Even the handling of foreign idioms may be put into the category of spontaneous 
translation. However much reflection and ingenuity went into the Greek rendering, 
it still proceeds straightforwardly from the source text. There is no shorter way than 
one of these: to render the form, the meaning, or a combination of the two. 
This most basic aspect of the translators’ work by all means involves exegesis. 
If the goal text is in many passages a faithful and accurate rendering of the Hebrew 
source, that doesn’t mean explanation is absent, but that it is successful. 
b) Deliberate exegesis
Over and beyond the more or less spontaneous rendering of the Hebrew into 
Greek, there are passages where a deliberate option to clarify the text can be 
observed. The distinction between spontaneous and deliberate interpretation 
cannot be made in absolute terms. There is a gliding scale of deliberateness. What 
can be said is that the translators do at times diverge from their usual procedures 
and write in Greek what they must have known did not stand in the Hebrew. A nice 
example is the rendering of an admittedly somewhat mysterious phrase in 
Deuteronomy 29:18(19) 
ha'meC.h;-ta, hw"r"h' tAps. ![;m;l.  
The Hebrew might be rendered: “so as to sweep away the drenched with the 
thirsty,” although many other interpretations have been proposed. The Septuagint 
version of this phrase is striking: 
i[na mh. sunapole,sh| o` a`martwlo.j to.n avnama,rthton 
“lest the sinner destroy the guiltless with him.” 
This is almost certainly a case where the translation did not proceed linearly 
from the source text. One may submit the translator understood (or thought he 
understood) the literal meaning of the Hebrew. However, having apprehended 
that the Hebrew phrase was metaphorical, he decided to decode the metaphor 
in translation (Aejmelaeus 2001, 550). Perhaps the rendering here reflects an 
existing exegetical tradition (Joosten 2005). At any rate, it represents a case of 
deliberate exegesis. 
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The decoding of figures of speech is not very usual in the Septuagint. Metaphors 
and metonymies are mostly rendered literally, their interpretation being left to the 
reader.3 It is only occasionally that one finds that “wool” is glossed as “clothes,” 
or “womb” is translated as “birth pangs” etc. (Joosten 1998, 77–79). Deliberate 
exegesis is the most interesting aspect of the translator’s activity; unfortunately, it 
is not very prominent in the Septuagint. 
*
Before moving on to the third category, an additional remark may be inserted. The 
distinction between “spontaneous” and “deliberate” exegesis can also be applied 
on a different, more formal level. Several scholars have argued that the translation 
technique of the Septuagint is itself a type of commentary. Notably, the literal quality 
of the version has been interpreted to express the translators’ awe for the word 
of God (Joosten 1998, 82–85). This view is correct, I think, though not perhaps 
for every part of the Septuagint to the same extent. The freewheeling translation 
technique one finds in the Pentateuch and Joshua strikes one as being rather 
spontaneous. Although the translation is literal, it is not exaggeratedly so. Its word-
for-word quality may reflect an “easy technique” rather than a deliberate decision. 
Other parts of the Bible are translated much more literally, however. In the Book of 
Hosea, for instance, an interesting struggle can be observed. On the one hand, the 
translator deploys great efforts to make sense of the difficult Hebrew; on the other 
hand, he seems to “give up” in a small number of passages, where the individual 
Hebrew words are rendered but no meaning emerges on the sentence level. 
These passages evince a degree of literalness surpassing the spontaneous. They 
witness to a deliberate choice of the translator, who bows to the text’s significance 
even where he could find in it no meaning. 
The same could be argued on the other end of the scale. Some books are 
translated with surprising freedom. The translator of Job has drastically shortened 
the book, leaving out many verses of the original. Conversely, the translator of 
Proverbs added a number of passages that were originally composed in Greek. 
These procedures also reflect a deliberate choice. The least that can be said is that 
the text of Job and Proverbs appear to have been less sacred to their translators 
than Hosea or Psalms would have been to theirs.
c) Accidental exegesis
If only spontaneous and deliberate exegesis is envisaged, many passages in the 
Septuagint will remain unaccounted for. A third category must be recognized, which 
3 The statement is true mainly for “live” metaphors. With “dead”, like “stone” meaning “weight”, 
the decoding may be qualified as spontaneous. Of course, it is not easy to make this distinction in 
all cases.
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may be called “accidental exegesis.” At times the meaning of the Greek diverges 
from that of the Hebrew, not because the two languages are incompatible, nor 
because the translator decided to spell out the implications of the source text, but 
through faulty analysis of the source text. Many specialists stop short of recognizing 
such a category. Indeed, it may seem mean-spirited to dwell on the errors of the 
ancients, to whom we owe so much. On top of this, the scholar who pretends to 
find fault with an ancient version may encounter criticism for being presumptuous: 
“Who are you to decide that this is the right way to translate the Hebrew, and that is 
the wrong way?” Nonetheless, the phenomenon under discussion is too important 
to be skirted. It is very frequent. And it results in interesting readings. Indeed, some 
of the most celebrated passages in the Septuagint may have been created through 
accidental exegesis. 
Mishaps may occur at every level of analysis, from the reading of the Hebrew 
consonants, through the vocalization and identification of grammatical forms, to 
the interpretation of words and constructions. Let us consider some examples. In 
Micah 6:9-10, the received Hebrew text reads:
dA[ `Hd"['y> ymiW “…and who appointed it? Still…”
This is not very eloquent and the text may indeed be corrupt. What is presently 
of interest is the Greek equivalent of these words:
kai. ti,j kosmh,sei po,lin “and who will rule a city?”
As can easily be made out, the last word in Greek reflects Hebrew ry[ ‘city,’ 
instead of dw[ ‘still,’ due to a confusion of consonants similar in form (waw and 
yod, daleth and resh). The preceding verb reflects a different vocalization, hD,[.y: “he 
will adorn” from hd[ ‘to adorn,’ instead of Hd"['y> from d[y ‘to appoint.’ The readings 
reflected in the version have no philological plausibility whatsoever. The resulting 
Greek is worthless when it comes to recovering the meaning intended in the 
Hebrew. But it does represent a very nice phrase: kosme,w po,lin means ‘to order, to 
rule a city.’ The Greek translation of the Twelve Minor Prophets is full of such minor 
rearrangements, due at least in part to the extreme difficulty of the Hebrew text. 
The result may be rather felicitous, as in the present case. Or it may be completely 
bizarre as in Hos 9:12 where God says of Israel: ouvai. auvtoi/j evstin( sa,rx mou 
evx auvtw/n “Woe is to them, my flesh proceeds from them.” Some church fathers 
interpret this as a reference to Christ’s issuing from Israel according to the flesh, 
but what the translator thought it meant is a mystery (Bons et al. 2002, 131–132).
Accidental exegesis is like spontaneous translation in that the translator 
produced the rendering more or less straightforwardly from his understanding of the 
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Hebrew. In most cases, one may submit, the translator thought he was producing a 
faithful rendering of the Hebrew. Accidental exegesis is like deliberate exegesis in 
that the resultant Greek diverges markedly from the source text. In most translation 
units, accidental divergences are much more prominent than deliberate ones. For 
a correct apprehension of the explanatory element in the Septuagint, it is of crucial 
importance to recognize the factor of accident. This remains true even if it is not 
always easy in practice to assign each divergence to its proper category. 
*
The key to a proper distinction of spontaneous, deliberate, and accidental 
explanation is the study of translation technique, in the widest sense. Establishing 
the normal procedures in a given translation unit will help in isolating those passages 
where the normal procedure was not followed. The latter passages may reflect a 
different source text or an alteration of the Greek text in its own textual tradition; 
however, where such extraneous factors can be ruled out, it becomes possible to 
identify a deliberate attempt at interpreting the source text – unless the translation 
is due to a mistake.
The Septuagint as Quotation
The passage from one language to another forces a translator to explain his 
source text. The Septuagint has often, and justifiably, been called the earliest 
commentary of the Hebrew Bible. Explanation, however, is not the only operation 
of the translator directly affecting the meaning of the text. When a text is translated, 
it is brought into a new communicative framework. A translation is like a quotation, 
reiterating an earlier text in a new speech situation.4
Now, the quoting of an earlier statement may at times require a change of the 
wording if the meaning is to be preserved. Let us take a biblical example. Hearing 
that she will at long last bear a child, Sarah says to herself: 
Genesis 18:12 
“After I am worn out, shall I have pleasure? And my husband too is old.” 
When God quotes this statement to Abraham, he changes the wording:
Genesis 18:13 
The Lord said to Abraham, “Why did Sarah laugh, and say, 
‘Shall I indeed bear a child, now that I am old.’”
4 For a taxonomy of forms of quotation, see Sternberg 1982.
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While Sarah spoke subjectively of pleasure, God, for the sake of Abraham, 
substitutes the objective notion of childbearing. What is striking, too, is that God’s 
quotation of Sarah’s words omits all reference to Abraham’s old age. According to 
the Talmud, God left this bit out for fear of starting a row between the old couple.5
In the Septuagint, changes of this nature remain rather inconspicuous. 
Geographical names are updated, ~r"a] ‘Aram’ is changed into Suri,a ‘Syria,’ and 
so on, and some weights and measures are adapted to Hellenistic equivalents, 
the weight called lq,v, ‘sheqel’ becoming, in some instances, a Greek monetary 
unit, di,dracmon etc. Many other instances are uncertain. A possible example is the 
following: 
Genesis 24:47
HP'a;-l[; ~z<N<h; ~fia'w" “I put the ring on her nose.”
In Greek this becomes:
perie,qhka auvth/| ta. evnw,tia “I put earrings on her.”
As it seems, the image of the ring in the nose of the matriarch was too shocking 
for Hellenistic Jews to countenance, and earrings were substituted for cultural 
reasons. The same change is made also in Isa 3:21, where @a'h' ymez>nI ‘the nose-
rings,’ is rendered as ta. evnw,tia ‘the earrings,’ showing that the change in Genesis 
is not simply due to chance.
Such interpretations, although attributed here to the “quotational” aspect of 
translation, are actually on the borderline of what has been termed explanation 
above. The only difference is that the latter difficulties are not of a linguistic or 
textual nature, but derive from wider cultural reasons. 
When a text is restated in a new situation, it may have to be updated a little. 
What has been less well recognized is the reverse: when a text is quoted verbatim 
under changed circumstances, the meaning may change appreciably. Language 
works by implication. Not all that is communicated needs to be stated explicitly. 
Part of the meaning of any text – whether oral or written – has to be figured out 
from the general context. Change the context and you change the meaning.  
Let us consider an example. Paul, the apostle, could not believe that the verse: 
“You shall not muzzle an ox while it is treading out the grain” (Deuteronomy 25:4) 
really referred to oxen. “Is God concerned for oxen?” he wondered (1Corinthians 
9:9). He therefore interpreted the verse to mean that the labourer is worthy of his 
5 BT Yeb. 65b.
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salary. Presumably the original law in Deuteronomy 25:4, addressing a society 
essentially based on agriculture, did have real oxen in mind. When this law was 
read in Tarsis, however, it meant something different. As a city-dweller, the idea 
that God should legislate for the benefit of oxen seemed absurd to Paul. The law 
therefore must have a figurative meaning.6 Whether this interpretation was already 
that of the translators of the Pentateuch is impossible to know, but it is not unlikely 
if the Septuagint was indeed created in the metropolis of Alexandria.
What I am arguing presently is not that readers can create new meanings (although 
they do). Rather, the process of translation itself happens in a communicative 
situation that determines part of the meaning of the goal text. This remains true, 
whether or not that communicative situation can be recovered. Usually, it cannot. 
Indeed, it is very difficult to analyse the “quotational” aspect of interpretation with 
respect to ancient translations of the Bible. We know very little about the Sitz im 
Leben of the original Septuagint. Even where we have comments by early readers, 
like Philo or the authors of the NT, it is often hard to know whether they accurately 
reflect the original meaning of the Greek. In many cases, it is more likely that later 
comments reflect the preoccupations of those who make them – which adds a 
further stage to the process and takes us beyond the limits of this paper.
The influence of the pragmatic situation on the meaning of the text operates 
not only on single verses, but on larger units as well. The Greek Pentateuch 
was created during a period when other accounts of Jewish origins were already 
circulating in the Greek world. Hecateus of Abdera, a Hellenistic historian of around 
300 BCE, makes the story of the Jewish people begin in Egypt. When a pestilence 
arose in their country, the Egyptians attributed their troubles to a divine agency; 
they decided, therefore, to expulse all foreigners, driving the greater number into 
what came to be called Judea; the colony was headed by a man called Moses, who 
founded Jerusalem, divided the people in 12 tribes and established many peculiar 
laws and customs. So far Hecateus. A few decades later, Manetho, an Egyptian 
priest writing in Greek, takes up the idea that the ancestors of the Jews were 
expulsed from Egypt. Instead of aliens, however, he speaks of Egyptian lepers and 
polluted persons. Manetho’s version became very popular, turning into a staple 
argument of anti-Semitic polemics. 
Although it cannot be proven that the Alexandrian Jews who produced the 
Greek Pentateuch knew Hecateus’ or Manetho’s works, it is hard to imagine that 
they hadn’t been confronted by accounts similar to theirs. The competing narratives 
must have been much debated in Jewish circles. The Greek Pentateuch may 
have been an important statement in an ongoing polemic between Egyptian Jews 
6 The interpretation finds parallels in Philo, and the underlying hermeneutics has been systematized 
by Origen: when the literal meaning is impossible, a spiritual meaning must be sought (Siegert 1996, 
184; Harl 1983, 90–92).
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and their pagan neighbours. One imagines the Jews would have appreciated the 
patriarchal narratives in particular. The origins of their people lay not in Egypt, but in 
Mesopotamia. Moreover, in all dealings they had with Egypt, their ancestors were 
eventually victorious. This polemic would not have been the only, or even the main 
reason for translating the Torah. But it would contribute to an extra layer of meaning 
– or at least, significance – of the Greek text. At least, so it would appear.
In recent cosmological theory, it is held that the universe is made of three 
ingredients: normal matter, dark matter, and dark energy.7 While the first is well known 
to all of us, and the second is familiar at least from science fiction movies, the third 
remains completely mysterious. Now, one might expect that dark energy, which no 
one has ever observed, let alone explained, would be rare. But this is not the case: 
scientists estimate there should be far more dark energy in the universe than normal 
and dark matter added together. This theory provides an analogy to our discussion 
of interpretation in the Septuagint. Only part of this can be retraced. Spontaneous, 
deliberate, and accidental exegesis all have to do with the way the translators 
apprehended the meaning of their source text on the linguistic and contextual levels. 
Retracing these elements is difficult, but it can be done, at least to a certain extent. 
The greater part, however, of the interpretation applied by the translators could only 
be determined if we knew the exact cultural and political conditions of the version’s 
creation. This side will probably always remain somewhat elusive. 
Conclusion
General linguistics has developed the distinction between locutionary and 
illocutionary speech acts. Texts and segments of communication have a locutionary 
meaning, making up a proposition. But they also have an illocutionary meaning, 
corresponding to the way the proposition is put to use in human communication: 
the proposition serves to inform, to promise, to command, to express a feeling, and 
so on. While the locutionary meaning flows from the words and the forms used, the 
illocutionary meaning is essentially determined by the speech situation. Thus, one 
and the same locutionary act may express entirely different illocutionary meanings 
according to the pragmatic context it is given. “Can you mow the lawn?” could 
mean: “Please do mow the lawn,” when said by a mother to her teenage son; or it 
could mean: “Are you able to mow the lawn now that you have a bionic arm?” in a 
conversation between disabled ex-servicemen (Closs Traugott 1980, 236).
The distinction of speech acts is coextensive with the distinction between the 
explanatory and the “quotational” quality of translation argued for above. Somewhat 
simplistically one could say that translation interacts with both the locutionary and 
7 See, e.g., the article on dark matter in Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dark_matter). 
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the illocutionary level of the source text. The propositional meaning needs to be 
rephrased in a different language. But the pragmatic meaning, too, will be affected. 
Setting the text in a new cultural situation changes its communicative function.
To translate is indeed to interpret. The process of explanation inherent in any 
translation created many changes in the Septuagint. Because the translators 
weren’t up to the philological challenge involved in their task, the changes produced 
at this level were in fact greater than they needed to be. Publishing this interpreted 
text among Hellenized Jews in Alexandria introduced further semantic shifts. 
Words do not express the same meaning if they are said or read in completely 
different situations. Unfortunately, we know too little about the Jewish community 
in Alexandria in the 3rd and 2nd centuries BCE to retrace more than a bare outline of 
this aspect of interpretation in the Septuagint. 
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